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Abstract 
In today’s harmonised European society, the importance of successful financial risk taking 
abilities and theirsubsequent governance is a current topic of discussion. The purpose of this 
paper is to test existing regulatory theories, and provide a framework for future research. 
Using Marianne Ojo’s theory (Ojo2010, 2011), this research attempts to answer the following 
research question: To what extent should the EU intervene in financial risk taking abilities at 
financial institutions? Using a deductive, qualitative research, five semi-structured face-to-
face interviews were conducted. All interviewees have experience working for a financial 
institution in the City of London. All interviewees were of Dutch, Dutch/American or British 
origin.  The study has identified two main findings.First, the EU is (currently) not capable of 
regulating the European financial institutions as a whole. Second, optimal regulation is a 
mixture between self-regulation and government regulation, favouring the self-regulation 
side. This finding forms the basis of the model of optimal regulation that slightly differs from 
the theories as discussed by Ojo.  The paper concludes with further research avenues 
stemming from the adjusted model. As the model is an approach to optimal regulation, it still 
needs to be tested to find the precise point of this form. It is recommended to adopt an 
economical scientific approach to conduct further research into the proposed model and 
subsequent theories. 
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Introduction 
In today’s competitive global financial market, there has been a growing European, and even 
worldwide, consensus that there ought to be a fundamental shift in financial regulation with 
regards to risk taking (Begg 2009; Nguyen 2011). The global financial crisis of 2007 starting 
with the collapse of subprime mortgage funds and related productsindicates that the current 
regulatory framework cannot effectively deal with the ‘new’ financial products (FSA 2009; 
Lang &Jagtiani 2010). Nevertheless, during the last two decades, not only has there been a 
rapid growth in the availability of new financial products, but the financial sector as a whole 
grew, i.e. more risks were taken, more and quicker transfers of financial goods occurred, and 
increasingly complex financial products were introduced (Dorn 2010; Pisani-Ferry & Sapir 
2010). A prime example of ‘new’ financial product and its vast growth is the Credit Default 
Swaps (CDS’s). Stulz (2010), using survey data from the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS), predictsthat the total notional amount of the credit default swap market was $6 trillion 
in 2004 and this grew to $57 trillion by June 2008. Therefore, the global economy benefited 
for many years as the economic growth, facilitated by the financial markets, was perceived to 
be infinite.  
Post-crises discussionshave drawn on the subject of financial risk taking abilities of 
financial institutions in the EU, seeking to implement a framework that aims to limit 
systematic risk (Begg 2009; Nguyen 2011). In this context, two questions seem fundamental 
to any policymaking regarding European financial markets. First, is it possible to have a 
European financial regulatory framework? And second, what form of involvement of different 
actors is desired in order to optimally regulate financial risk taking? This paper contributes to 
answering these questions. More precisely, it aims to find out how feasible current theories on 
market regulation are from the point of view of financial professionals. Marianne Ojo 
conducted two separate researches in 2010 and 2011, which will function as a basis to which 
this research seeks to contribute.  
For the purpose of this research, financial risk taking is defined as the search for the 
highest financial return (gain) possible, and includes the possibility of losing invested capital 
(Freixas 2010; FSA 2009; Nguyen 2011). It can be argued that financial regulation should 
seek to minimalise these posed risks (De Larosière 2009). Risk-takingabilities are defined as 
the means a financial institution possesses to take financial risks (Ferguson & Johnson 2009; 
Johnson 2011). Since the creation of the European Union, more market harmonisation has 
been desired (Buckley & Howarth 2010). The European internal financial market has been 
created, in order to stimulate economic traffic between member countries (Buckley & 
 3 
Howarth 2010; Garcia & Nieto 2005). Nevertheless, each country individually formulates its 
financial regulation(De Larosière 2009; FSA 2009).  Thus, it is important to define financial 
regulation. Financial regulation can be explained asbeing the framework that seeks to address 
indifferences in the financial markets(Dijkstra 2009; FSA 2009; Mayes 2009). Begg (2009) 
argues that financial regulation has a number of purposes, including legislation and 
supervision. According to Johnson (2011), financial regulation has the task to serve and 
protect the integrity of the economy and financial institutions.  
 
Ojo 
Marianne Ojo(2011) conducted research on meta-regulation, which is the ability of financial 
institutions to contribute to the regulatory framework, using their experience from internal 
regulation. Ojo (2011) argues that current legislatory and enforcing frameworks are not yet 
prepared to successfully perform their tasks with regards to financial risk regulation. Ojo 
(2010)investigates the main theories involved with financial regulatory frameworks: self-
regulation, government regulation, and mixed regulation. Self-regulation assumes that non-
governmental actors posses the ability and willingness to regulate themselves (Ojo 2011). 
This implies that people are honest, that financials have an internal regulatory framework that 
can sanctionaccording to the crime or foul committed, without the interference of the 
government (Ojo 2010; Short &Toffel 2010). 
In theory self-regulation could work.However, in reality this only seems to work in 
times of economic growth.People and institutions have different social and economic 
motives;and in times of crises conflicts of interests occur (Short &Toffel 2010). Ojo (2010) 
argues that if people are working for the same company striving for financial gain, self-
regulation will not happen adequately.Therefore, it can be argued that pure self-regulation 
currently does not enable successful financial risk taking, as it poses a risk to the European 
economy. Government regulation assumesthat the more a government intervenes, the less 
malpractices there are (Garcia & Nieto 2005; Johnson 2011). Shleifer and Vishny (1998) state 
there are two forms of government regulation. There is the ‘Helping hand’ theory, which 
means that the government is adequately prepared to regulate and stimulate the financial 
sector (Shleifer&Vishny 1998). There is also the ‘grabbing hand’ theory, which implies that 
governments are inadequately prepared and slow.In addition, ‘grabbing hand’ argues that 
financial institutions can better regulate themselves as it is in their interest to stimulate 
economic growth (Shleifer&Vishny 1998). 
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Davis (1989) uses Adam Smith to argue that the more a government influences an economy, 
the less beneficial it is as it can result in protectionism. This implies that there should be as 
little government interference as possible.Geske& Roll (1983); and Atkaset al.(2004), argue 
more or less the same using more economic, quantifiable research. Atkaset al. (2004), have 
noted that most researches with regards to government interference and financial markets 
have concluded that regulatory activities can lead tolimitedor reduced competition. 
Additionally, more regulation can lead to less liquidity in financial markets, thus implying 
restrictions on available capital (Roll et al. 2007). However, leaving the financial sector 
unregulated has put the economy as a whole in jeopardy, as financials cannot cope with the 
great responsibilities (Lang &Jagtiani 2010; Nichols et al. 2011; Pisani-Ferry & Sapir 
2010).Interestingly, others argue that regulation, notably the Basel II covenant, has allowed 
financial institutions to develop risky new financial products that aggravated the recent crises 
(Blundell-Wignallet al. 2008; Moosa 2010). Critical analysis shows that governments are too 
far removed from the market and are unable to adapt to new situations (Arlman 2003; Mayes 
2009).Government regulation, the direct opposite to self-regulation, is not beneficial for the 
EU as it limits financial risk taking abilities (Ojo 2011). Hence, there should be a mean 
between overregulation and too much deregulation in order to stimulate the financial markets 
and the economy, yet maintaining their integrity.  
Using the self-regulation and government regulation theories, some argue that optimal 
governance is the co-operative regulation framework, which is a mixture between the two 
(Johnson 2011). It can be stated that this framework is already being used.However, the 
communication between the different actors is confused, as they all pursue different goals 
(Begg 2009; Ojo 2010; Papaikonomou 2010). In order for this theory to work, those involved 
should align their goals and seek for a stable economy that continues to grow (Garcia et al. 
2009; Garcia & Nieto 2005). 
According to Ojo (2011), enforced self-regulation is a more individualistic approach 
to the co-operative framework, and to an extent builds on it. It differs from self-regulation as 
the government keeps an oversight (Ojo 2010). It differs from co-operative regulation, as the 
government does not intervene when not necessary (Ojo 2010). In other words, the Co-
operative regulation and Enforced self-regulation are a middle or mixture between the two 
opposites. However, they do need clear communication, cooperation and monitoring in order 
for a successful enhancement of the European Union financial market’s competitive edge.  
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Methodology 
Research can be regarded as a systematic investigation to find answers to a phenomenon 
(Blaxteret al. 2006). In order to research the phenomenon of financial risk taking in the EU, 
this paper builds on existing theory, thus can be regarded as deductive. More precisely, Ojo’s 
model of mixed regulation was used to inform discussions with financial professionals about 
potential and desired financial market regulation in Europe.Rather than attempting to quantify 
opinions through a survey, a qualitative approach was chosen. This would also allow 
contextualised ideas and regulatory alternatives to emerge through the research (Adler & 
Adler 1994 adapted from Denzin& Lincoln 1994). Qualitative observers are not bound by 
predetermined categories, which allows for a ‘free’ search (Blaxteret al. 2006; Saunders et al. 
1997). 
Due to the complexity of the subject, the research did not seek to include those 
without knowledge of financial risk taking and regulation. Therefore, five semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with financial industry experts. The researcher has tried to 
incorporate the views of politicians.However, due to their lack of willingness to participate, 
the research has focussed on industry specialists. This subsequently leads towards a bias view 
from within the industry. Regardless, the validity of this paper remains, as it test an existing 
theory, using an industry perspective.The researcher acknowledges that the participants are 
personal contacts. The key informants work at a range of financial institutions: banks, 
investment firms and pension funds.  Of the 5 interviewees, 3 were of Dutch, one of 
Dutch/American and one of British origin. All interviewees have worked or arecurrently 
working in the City of London. This allows a cross regional, cross sectional comparison, 
meaning that the participants operated in different areas of the financial market, but also have 
a different European national background. This latter is interesting as this research discusses 
the EU involvement. The participants work either at a senior or middle level. 
When conducting a study, it is necessary to acknowledge that all research is to an 
extent contaminated by the values and beliefs of a researcher (Weber 1946 adapted from 
Gerth& Mills 1991). When critically looking at the research conducted, it is important to bear 
in mind that qualitative research is ideologically driven, and that there is no value-free or bias-
free design (Denzin& Lincoln 1994). The researcher has experience working for a financial 
institution hence perhaps favouring the industry. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the ‘free’ 
search has allowed little biases. As the semi-structured interviews were conducted in both 
English and Dutch, it is also important to note that there are always translation issues, as 
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words get rephrased (Marschan-Piekkari& Reis 2004 adapted:Marschan-Piekkari& Welch 
2004; Sinkovics&Penz 2011).  
 
Findings and discussion 
Even though it is desired by the European Union, our interviewees were of the opinion – in 
line withOjo (2011) - that is it not possible at the moment to implement a European financial 
regulatory framework, which regulates, monitors and enforces successfully. Nevertheless, this 
research has indeed identified that it would be favourable to regulate financial risk taking on a 
European and perhaps even global level. The participants are of the opinion that you could set 
up some sort of framework or guidance. They all agree that it is currently not possible to 
successfully regulate financial risk in the EU, but that this will occurin the future. Participant 
3 notably argued that the Euro was ‘not possible 20 years ago and look where we are now’.  
It has proven to be extremely difficult to implement successful financial regulation 
and maintain a sufficient level of oversight in the EU (FSA 2009; OECD 2003). This has been 
confirmed by the findings of this research. As Dijkstra (2009) states, every country needs a 
different form of regulation as member countries have different needs. These needs will lead 
to a slower adaption of new regulation and issues monitoring the financial market (De 
Larosière 2009; OECD 2003; Ojo 2011). Ojo (2011) argues that the law enforcers are not 
adequately equipped to deal with the pace of financial instruments developments. All 
participants fully agree with these two statements. However, our interviewees also believe 
that it is possible to create a successful framework, which governments can use as 
guidanceyetat the same time amend it to the particular needs of the country. This is also 
desired, but not implemented by the EU as such. Hence our interview data seem to contradict 
Dijkstra (2009), De Larosière (2009), OECD (2003), and Ojo (2011) who have less positive 
expectations.  
Our research agrees with Ojo’s framework that a form of mixed regulation is needed. 
It is noteworthy that all respondents believe that government regulation will not work when 
regulating the financial market. However, when asked whether financial institutions can 
regulate themselves, three out of five participants responded initially with yes. Nevertheless, 
they all acknowledge that it has proven to be unsuccessful. Still, in every interview it was 
mentioned that the current regulators are always playing ‘catch up’ with the market. Our 
interviewees seemed to agree with Shleifer and Vishny’s (1998) ‘grabbing hand’ theory 
where the government is too slow and inadequately prepared. Ojo (2011) describes this as 
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regulators and enforcers not possessing the right tools and means. All respondents have stated 
this, and believe that the regulators are slow and are always one step behind the market. 
Whereas all participants agreed that things had to be changed, and that structural 
changes would be favourable, they were all sceptical about falling back into old habits. When 
asked, the interviewees all statedthat a mix of regulation would be the best, when government 
work together with financial institutions in order to keep a successful oversight. All 
participants were of the opinion that the government should hold the enforcement role, but 
that the institutions should be left free in order to generate growth in the financial market. The 
respondents all agreed that even though a mix is favourable, it should be more towards the 
self-regulation side. Hence, our findings suggest that the successful regulation in order to 
stimulate financial risk taking without endangering the system can be found on the self-
regulation side, but that government involvement is necessary.Short &Toffel (2010) and Ojo 
(2010) have argued that self-regulation in the pure sense of the theory does not work, as 
people have different social and economic motives, and therefore are not truly honest. 
Ourinterview data shows similar responses, although their stance is not as harsh as that of 
Short &Toffel (2010), as some respondents argue that self-regulation is possible, if necessary 
changes would be made. Ojo (2010) identified a mixed form of regulation between 
government regulation and self-regulation. Johnson (2011) regards thisas the optimal form of 
regulation. All of our interviewees agreedthat optimal regulation is cooperation between 
financial institutions and the government.  
Ojo (2010, 2011) identified ‘Enforced self-regulation’as self-regulation where the 
government keeps an oversight. Our interviewees leaned towards this form. However there 
were important elements in the interview data that did not fit Ojo’s Enforced self-regulation. 
These elements suggest a further distinct form of regulation. 
 
Amending Ojo’s model 
All interviewees saw regulation as directly interfering with financial risk taking 
abilities. Participant 5 also identified that with or without severe regulation and legislation, 
financial risk taking would occur to certain extent. Bearing this in mind, and the previous 
identified points, it can be argued that too much regulation will allow less risk taking abilities 
then self-regulation. Ojo’s research into the concepts of mixed regulation can be regarded as a 
good framework to which this research would like to add a fifth category, one that more 
accurately describes the current views of financial professionals. Figure 1 presents Ojo’s 
(2010) model. Figure 2 shows the amended model. In both models (figures 1 and 2), self-
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regulation and government regulation are regarded in the pure sense of the theory. With 
regards to risk taking abilities, which is presented by the line in the models, self-regulation is 
the most favourable to risk taking. Under strict government regulation, financial risk taking 
will still occur, but at a minimum level.  
 
 
 
Our research confirms Ojo (2010)suggesting that optimal regulation is a mixed regulation 
method. But that is where similarities end.Enforced self-regulation is a form of mixed 
regulation (Ojo 2010). This research does acknowledge the significance of this theory, 
however, it is highly hypothetical. It does not specify the level of interference. Hence, a class 
was added. In the proposed model (figure 2), there are five classes of financial regulation. To 
illustrate the point, more self-regulation and more government regulation are explained in 
table 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure1: Ojo’s model (2010) 
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Table 1: Proposed classes of financial regulation 
Model value Regulation  
(%, self-gov) 
Risk taking 
abilities 
Only Self-
regulation 
Only self-
regulation  
(100%-0%) 
High 
More self-
regulation 
Mixed regulation, 
focussed on self-
regulation 
(75%-25%) 
Relatively high 
Equal 
involvement 
Mixed regulation, 
same contribution 
(50%-50%) 
Average 
More government 
regulation 
Mixed regulation, 
focussed on 
government 
regulation  
(25%-75%) 
Relatively low 
Only Government 
regulation 
Only government 
regulation  
(0%-100%) 
Low 
 
More self-regulation can be regarded as enforced self-regulation. Nevertheless, the 
involvement level is specified more accurately. It can be argued that the pre-crisis regulation 
was indeed more self-regulation as financial institutions were left relatively free, and thus 
regulated themselves, and the government would only interfere when needed. This is an 
example of post-Thatcherism, harmonised union ideal, and enabled great innovation and 
economic prosperity. 
More government regulation can be explained as a theory where the government 
controls and where the financial institutions have little input. Again risk taking will occur, but 
at a relatively low level. This is what is proposed for standardised financial products, where 
the government allows risk taking, on the basis of sufficient capital, understanding of risk, etc. 
and it will actively supervise and control in this market. Whether this works to avoid a new 
crisis is highly questionable. 
The second column in table 1 explains the form of regulation, and the approached % 
of self-regulation in comparison to government regulation. For instance, 75%-25% means 
75% self-regulation and 25% government regulation, and 0%-100% means no self-regulation 
and a 100% government regulation. It can be assumed that Ojo’s Co-operative 
regulationisbetween equal involvement and government regulation, but this could mean that 
this form of regulation is actually equal involvement (table 1). Additionally, this works for 
Ojo’s Enforced self-regulation, as this again could include equal involvement (table 1). Figure 
2 visualises our model as set forth in table 1.  
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Figure2: Proposed model 
 
 
Furthermore, the findings have indicated the ideal mixture between self-regulation and 
government regulation is the optimal mixture, as it will stimulate financial risk taking without 
creating a systematic financial market risk. Figure 3 highlights the area in our proposed model 
where, according to our interview findings, optimal regulation occurs. 
 
Figure 3: Optimal regulation model 
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Notwithstanding, although the participants have identified the area as shown in figure 3, more 
in-depth study should be conducted to identify the ‘perfect’ mixture, seeking for the exact 
point of involvement. 
 
Conclusion 
In summary this research agrees with Ojo (2011), that the EU is (currently) not able to 
implement a successful single financial regulatory framework. Our findings are also in line 
with Ojo (2010), namely that optimal European financial regulation is understood to be a 
mixed regulatory framework, leaning towards the self-regulation side. However, our 
interview findings suggest that the Ojo (2010)4-type model does not accurately describe the 
needs of the EU and financial institutions. Therefore, this research has proposed to add a fifth 
type, renaming existing theories to accommodate this type. As figure 3 shows, optimal 
regulation can be found in the more self-regulation class. It is important to note that the 
proposed optimal regulation model (figure 3) is merely a framework, and does not stipulate a 
concrete optimal regulation initiative or policy. Further research aimed at identifying such 
initiatives might find our framework helpful.  Further research could also test the proposed 
model with governmental policy makers, as with constituents in other financial centres around 
the world. Notwithstanding, it can be assumed that optimal financial regulation can be found 
in more self-regulation, in order to maximise financial risk taking without creating structural 
economic risk. 
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